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THE NLRB WIELDS ITS RULEMAKING
AUTHORITY: THE NEW FACE OF
REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS
“Big Labor has found faithful friends on the Obama N.L.R.B., who
are working hard to fix a process that isn’t broken.”1
INTRODUCTION
In June 2011, a majority of the National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB” or “Board”) proposed radical revisions to its representation
election procedures. The final rules were published in the Federal
Register on December 22, 2011 and will take effect on April 30,
2012—less than one year after they were first proposed. The
unprecedented controversy that followed the June announcement
involved a two-day public Board meeting, legislation intended to
block the undesirable effects of the proposed amendments, and at
least one federal lawsuit. This latest—and radical—attempt at
substantive rulemaking has left many observers questioning the
legitimacy of the Board itself.
This Comment analyzes the substance of these amendments, their
practical effect on all parties, and the reasons for their enactment.
This Comment concludes that the amendments are unprecedented,
sweeping, and unfair; they put employers at an extreme disadvantage
in their ability to express their views about unionization, and, as a
result, deprive employees of their right to make an informed decision.
Part I provides a brief overview of the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”),2 focusing on its main provisions; the NLRB, and its
function as an adjudicative versus rule-making body; and finally, the
NLRB’s existing representation election procedures. Part II then
1 See Steven Greenhouse, N.L.R.B. Rules Would Streamline Unionizing, N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 2011, at B3 (quoting Representative John Kline commenting on recent amendments to
NLRB representation election procedures).
2 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151–169 (2006).
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explores the significant decline in union membership and considers
whether that decline can be attributed to an unfair election process.
Part III details the substantive changes made to representation
elections through the Board’s amended election rules, as well as what
the Board intends to accomplish with these new rules, and analyzes
whether these new amendments effect a positive or negative change.
Part III also analyzes the reaction to and controversy surrounding the
proposed amendments and criticizes the Board’s reasoning and its
hasty decision-making process.
I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE NLRA, NLRB, ITS ADJUDICATIVE
VERSUS RULEMAKING FUNCTION, AND REPRESENTATION ELECTION
The NLRA is the principal law governing relations between labor
organizations and private-sector employers engaged in interstate
commerce.3
A. The NLRA Is Born and Its Constitutionality Is Upheld
The NLRA was enacted in 1935 with the passage of the Wagner
Act.4 In order to promote commerce and alleviate industrial strife,5
the Act made explicit employees’ rights to organize and bargain
collectively. Specifically, the Act provided that “[e]mployees shall
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 6
The NLRA also affirmed employees’ right to strike, curtailed private
sector labor and management practices that could injure both
individual employees and the national economy, prescribed the
process for representation elections, created the NLRB, and provided
for judicial enforcement and review of Board orders.7

GERALD MAYER, UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2004).
DOUGLAS E. RAY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING LABOR LAW 9 (3d ed. 2011).
5 See 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (stating the purpose and policy of the Act); cf. RAY ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 10 (“Senator Wagner [author of the Act] primarily saw the Act as a weapon
against the Depression, which he attributed to underconsumption caused by too unequal a
distribution of wealth. Collective bargaining, he thought, would both restore an element of
fairness and industrial democracy to the workplace, and redistribute wealth in such a way as to
reinvigorate the economy.”).
6 RAY ET AL., supra note 4, at 10 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000)).
7 See id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 153–54, 158, 159, 160, and 163) (describing the principle
features of the original Act); see also, National Labor Relations Act, NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/national-labor-relations-act (last visited Dec. 29,
2011) (identifying the congressional motivations for the Act).
3
4
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The Commerce Clause, which gives Congress the power “[t]o
regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,”8 is the
constitutional basis for the Act.9 Professor William B. Gould IV of
Stanford Law School10 noted that “[t]he constitutional theory upon
which the [Act] is predicated is that statutory regulation of labor and
management is necessary to diminish industrial strife that could
disrupt interstate commerce.”11 The Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corporation,12 upheld the Act. Chief Justice
Hughes’s majority opinion rejected the idea that labor relations had
only an indirect effect on interstate commerce:
When industries organize themselves on a national scale,
making their relation to interstate commerce the dominant
factor in their activities, how can it be maintained that their
industrial labor relations constitute a forbidden field into
which Congress may not enter when it is necessary to protect
interstate commerce from paralyzing consequences of
industrial war?13
Because the ability of employees to bargain collectively is “an
essential condition of industrial peace,” the Court held that the
national government was justified in penalizing employers that
“[r]efus[ed] to confer and negotiate” with their employees.14
B. The NLRB
The NLRA is administered by the NLRB. The Board is principally
charged with conducting representation elections and investigating
unfair labor practices.15 However, the Board also has the power to
adjudicate cases when the NLRB Administrative Judge decision is
appealed.16 A panel of three Board members usually decides these
cases; but the full Board will hear those that are “novel or potentially

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 28 (4th ed. 2004).
10 Directory, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.stanford.edu/directory/profile/26/
(last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
11 GOULD, supra note 9, at 28.
12 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
13 Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
14 Id. at 42.
15 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) and (c); 160(a) (2006) (vesting in
the Board powers related to the conduct of representation elections and the prevention of unfair
labor practices); see also RAY ET AL., supra note 4, at 21–22 (detailing the primary functions of
the Board).
16 Decide Cases, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/decidecases (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).
8
9
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precedent changing.”17 Case-by-case adjudication is the primary
method by which the Board exercises its policy-making authority.18
The Board is typically comprised of five members.19 Each member
is appointed for a five-year term by the President, subject to Senate
approval, with one member’s term expiring each year.20 But when the
Board amended its election procedures in 2011, the Republicancontrolled Senate had blocked each of President Obama’s
nominations and, as a result, the NLRB was composed of only three
members.21 President Obama named Mark G. Pearce, already a Board
member, Chairman after Wilma B. Liebman relinquished the position
at the expiration of her term.22 Pearce’s term will expire in August
2013.23 Brian Hayes, the only Republican Board member, will lose
his position in December 2012.24 The term of the third Board
member, Craig Becker, a recess appointment,25 expired in January
2012.26 The composition of the Board is an important preface to a
discussion of the Board’s revisions to its representation election
procedures because the position taken by each member during the
comment period bears on this Comment’s analysis that the revisions
are largely defective.

Id.
See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
19 RAY ET AL., supra note 4, at 21.
20 Id; accord 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006).
21 See
National Labor Relations Board, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2012),
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/organizations/n/national_labor_relations_
board/index.html [hereinafter Times Topics] (discussing a twenty-six month period in which
Democrats and Republicans blocked each others’ Board nominees).
22 Mark G. Pearce, NATIONAL LABOR R ELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-weare/board/mark-g-pearce-chairman (last visited Mar. 3, 2011); Times Topics, supra note 21.
23 Mark G. Pearce, supra note 22.
24 Brian Hayes, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-weare/board/brian-hayes (last visited Mar. 3, 2011).
25 Recess appointments are temporary Presidential appointments made when the Senate is
not in session. HENRY B. HOGUE, RECESS APPOINTMENTS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1
(2011). The terms of recess appointees are temporary, however, and expire at the end of the next
session. Id.
26 Board
Members Since 1935, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/board-members-1935 (last visited Mar. 3, 2012)
(indicating that Member Becker served until January 3, 2012). On January 4, 2012, President
Obama bypassed the Senate advise-and-consent process and extreme Republican opposition by
making three recess appointments to the Board. Rick Manning, Obama’s Extraconstitutional
NLRB Appointments, THE HILL (Jan. 5, 2011), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/thejudiciary/202617-obamas-extraconstitutional-nlrb-appointments. He acted while Congress,
which had been meeting in intermittent sessions to prevent this very result, was away for
holiday break. Lisa Mascaro, Bypassing Congress, Obama will appoint three to NLRB, L.A.
TIMES, (Jan. 4, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/04/news/la-pn-obama-nlrb-recessappointments-20120104.
17
18
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1. The NLRB’s Rulemaking Authority
The Board undoubtedly possesses substantive rulemaking power.
This power is rooted in section 156 of the Act: “The Board shall have
authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind, in the
manner prescribed by [the Administrative Procedure Act],27 such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions
of this [Act].”28 In American Hospital Association v. NLRB, a
unanimous Court upheld the Board’s substantive rulemaking
authority.29 In that case, the Board had promulgated a rule to define
the scope of collective bargaining units in healthcare facilities.30 The
Court held that the Board’s “broad rulemaking” powers31 under
section 156 were “unquestionably sufficient to authorize the rule at
issue.”32 In sustaining the rule, the Court noted the “extensive notice
and comment rulemaking conducted by the Board, its careful analysis
of the comments that it received, and its well-reasoned justification
for the new rule.”33
The Board also has broad discretion to choose whether to exercise
its rulemaking authority or rely exclusively on adjudication.34 As one
commentator explained, “[this choice] probably does not reflect a
straight-forward effort to identify the method that will produce the
best substantive decision. The agency will be primarily concerned
with choosing a policy-making method that will allow it to be
efficient and yet survive judicial review.”35 Nevertheless, courts defer
to this choice because they understand that agencies, given the
minefield in which they must operate, are in the best position to
27 The Administrative Procedures Act prescribes extensive procedural requirements. First,
general notice of the proposed rule must be published in the Federal Register. Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2011). After the notice is published, the agency must provide
interested persons a reasonable period of time to comment on the proposed rules. Id. at § 553(c).
Finally, after consideration of the comments, the agency must finalize the rule and incorporate
in the rule a concise statement of its basis and purpose. Id.
28 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2006).
29 499 U.S. 606, 606 (1991).
30 Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 608 (1991). See Collective-Bargaining Units
in the Health Care Industry, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336 (April 21, 1989) (to be codified as 29 C.F.R.
pt. 103) for a full text of the final health care rule.
31 499 U.S. at 613.
32 Id. at 610.
33 Id. at 618; see also Claire Tuck, Note, Policy Formulation at the NLRB: A Viable
Alternative to Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1117, 1132–35 (2005)
(examining the success of the health care collective bargaining unit rule—the last major
substantive rulemaking issued by the Board).
34 See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974) (“[T]he Board has
discretion to decide that the adjudicative procedures in this case may also produce the relevant
information necessary to mature and fair consideration of the issues.”).
35 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Rulemaking Versus Adjudication: A Psychological Perspective,
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 529, 531 (2005).
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choose the appropriate course of action.36 Notably, the NLRB has
relied almost exclusively on case-by-case adjudication.37 In enacting
comprehensive changes to its representation election rules, the Board
disregarded this self-imposed tradition.
2. A Preliminary Analysis: Rulemaking as a Superior Law-Making
Mechanism
Many commentators recommend that the Board enact more law
through formal rulemaking instead of case-by-case adjudication.38 In
particular, rulemaking would produce stability and confidence in
Board rules, ensure political accountability, and enhance policy
making.
The primary benefit of rulemaking is that it would produce
stability and confidence in Board rules. Adjudication provides little
guidance to regulated parties or the agency itself. As one
commentator observed, “[u]nless the adjudicatory decision is
distorted with dictum on situations not involved in the case being
decided, both agency and regulated public must resort to reading a
line of cases and formulating from them a statement of the principles
or policies followed by the NLRB with respect to a particular
matter.”39 Rulemaking would enable laypersons and lawyers alike to
understand and adhere to Board rules.40 The process would also give
those subject to the rules greater confidence that the rules will not
transform with each new administration.41
Id. at 532.
See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Potential of Rulemaking by the NLRB, 5 FIU L. REV. 411,
412 (2009) (“[I]n the past 20 years, the Board has issued a smattering of procedural, privacy,
and housekeeping rules—mostly as final rules—and has used the notice-and-comment process
only 17 times.”); Rachlinski, supra note 35, at 530 (“Some agencies, notably the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB), make policy largely through the adjudication process.”).
38 See, e.g., Lubbers, supra note 37, at 435 (“The NLRB should reconsider its longstanding antipathy toward rulemaking.”); cf. Tuck, supra note 33, at 1140 (“[B]ecause of
increasing opposition from Congress, problems resulting from the judicial review process,
partisan divisions at the NLRB itself, and the lack of well-developed precedents for
controversial issues, rulemaking at the NLRB is currently not feasible for controversial,
substantive issues.”).
39 Cornelius J. Peck, A Critique of the National Labor Relations Board’s Performance in
Policy Formulation: Adjudication and Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 254, 272 (1968).
40 See id. (“[T]o the extent possible the Board should try to be of service to nonspecialists, whether laymen or lawyers.”).
41 See Samuel Estreicher, Improving the Administration of the National Labor Relations
Act Without Statutory Change, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 13–14 (2009) (“NLRB policy
reversals—which come with each new administration as surely as spring follows winter—is
another area where properly employed rulemaking would enhance the confidence of the parties
that acting in conformity with preexisting Board law will not result in adverse remedial
consequences.”); Lucas R. Aubrey, NLRB Decisions and the Role of Precedent, LAB. & EMP.
LAW, Winter 2010, at 3 (“A switch to resolution of significant policy disputes through formal
rulemaking might reduce the perceived flip-flopping in board law.”).
36
37
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The rulemaking process would also ensure political accountability.
It may be unclear, in the course of a particular adjudication, whether
the Board is making an important policy decision.42 Conversely, if it
were to utilize rulemaking, the Board could not avoid political
accountability by masquerading important policy decisions as facts
specific to an individual adjudication.43
The Board’s use of formal rulemaking, therefore, would be a
welcome departure from its customary reliance on case-by-case
adjudication. Indeed, some members of the public applauded the
Board for its most recent use of the process to propose amendments to
the representation election process. Professor Lofaso, for instance,
said that “[t]he Board should be commended for acting under its
statutory rulemaking authority to modernize outdated and confusing
rules.”44 She also offered that “[t]his is good government acting at its
best.”45 However, for the reasons set forth in Part III, the Board’s use
of rulemaking with respect to its representation election procedures
was defective, or at least inadequate.
C. Representation Elections
Employees have the right to unionize or, alternatively, to decertify
a union when they no longer wish to be represented.46 A primary and
critical function of the NLRB is to conduct secret ballot elections to
determine whether a majority of employees wish to be represented by
a particular labor union.47 Both unions and employers must adhere to
intricate procedural requirements throughout the election process.48
Because the NLRA itself provides little guidance as to election
procedures, unions and employers must look instead to those Rules
and Regulations that the Board has promulgated.49 These
requirements, as well as the resolution of pre- and post-election issues
Peck, supra note 39, at 272.
Tuck, supra note 33, at 1126.
44 NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., PUBLIC MEETING ON PROPOSED ELECTION RULE
CHANGES 11 (2011) [hereinafter PUBLIC MEETING] (statement of Anne Marie Lofaso).
45 Id. at 36.
46 Employee Rights, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-weprotect/employee-rights (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).
47 See RAY ET AL., supra note 4, at 60 (“Typically, the method by which employees select
a union, or choose not to be represented by one, is by a majority vote in a secret ballot election
in an appropriate bargaining unit.”).
48 See infra Part I.C.3.
49 RAY ET AL., supra note 4, at 60. The Rules and Regulations relevant to representation
elections are codified in 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.60–102.72. The NLRB published its first series of
Rules and Regulations in the Federal Register on April 18, 1936. See Representation—Case
Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 80,138, 80,142 (Dec. 22, 2011) (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. pts. 101
and 102) [hereinafter Final Amendments].
42
43
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concerning the appropriateness of the bargaining unit and conduct of
the election, are set forth below.
1. Defining the Bargaining Unit
Only those units of employees with a “community of interest” are
appropriate for unionization.50 Among the factors that the Board
considers in determining the appropriateness a particular bargaining
unit are: (1) “whether the employees are under common supervision”;
(2) “on what basis the employees have communicated or bargained in
the past”; (3) “whether the employees have contact with one another
at the workplace and whether, for instance, they clock in and clock
out at the same location”; (4) “similarity in the type of work
performed”; (5) “similarities in wages, hours, and working
conditions”; and (6) “the desires of the employees.”51 Those
employees with a supervisory status are excluded from the voting
unit.52
Unions possess a unique advantage in their ability to define the
bargaining unit. Richard A. Epstein, professor at the New York
University School of Law,53 explained that “[u]nion support is not
uniform in workplaces, and this power of unit designation allows the
union to shrink or expand the unit in order to maximize its chances of
overall success.”54 Thus, defining the bargaining unit is a critical step
in the representation election process.
2. Important Prerequisites to a Representation Election
Once the bargaining unit is defined, the union must file an election
petition with the nearest Regional Office,55 along with a “showing of
interest” demonstrating that at least 30 percent of the employees in
the proposed unit want the union in question to represent them.56 The
GOULD, supra note 9, at 40.
Id.
52 ROBERT
LEWIS & WILLIAM A. KRUPMAN, WINNING NLRB ELECTIONS:
MANAGEMENT’S STRATEGY AND PREVENTIVE PROGRAMS 156 (2d ed. 1979). Supervisory status
is important because if a supervisor is included in the bargaining unit, and the union wins the
election, that supervisor is covered by the contract. Id. at 157. On the other hand, “[w]ith the
benefit of hindsight, the employer who has lost a close election may regret the day his caution
influenced him to exclude these employees from the voting unit.” Id.
53 Faculty Profiles: Richard Epstein, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW,
https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/profile.cfm?personID=26355 (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
54 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE C ASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT 42
(2009).
55 Frequently
Asked Questions—NLRB, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
http://www.nlrb.gov/faq/nlrb (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
56 RAY ET AL., supra note 4, at 61. The union could turn over as proof of substantial
support through signed and dated authorization cards or a petition signed by the requisite
50
51
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Regional Director then conducts a preliminary investigation to
determine whether there is “reasonable cause to believe that a
question of representation affecting commerce exists.”57
If the Regional Director determines that the petition is properly
supported, he or she serves the parties with a hearing notice, which is
designed to resolve contested questions—such as when and where the
election will occur, the appropriateness of the bargaining unit, and
voter eligibility—before the election is conducted.58 The hearing
officer takes evidence in a non-adversarial hearing and forwards a
transcript to the Regional Director.59 The Regional Director then
reviews the hearing record and any post-hearing briefs, issues
findings and conclusions as to the contested issues, and either orders a
representation election or dismisses the petition.60
The employer, in turn, must provide the Board with an Excelsior
list within seven days of the election order.61 This requirement is
named after Excelsior Underwear Incorporated. v. NLRB,62 in which
the Board held that an employer is obligated under section 158(a)—
which prohibits an employer from interfering with or coercing
employees in their right to unionize63—to supply to the union upon
request an accurate list of eligible voters’ names and addresses.64 The
Excelsior list is an important tool for the campaigning union, and,
accordingly, this requirement is strictly enforced.65 Even though
section 158(a) limits what an employer may say to its employees
during a campaign, the employer may explain to its employees that it
was required by the Board to turn over the information contained in
the Excelsior list.66

number of employees. Id. (citations omitted).
57 NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.63(a) (2011).
58 RAY ET AL., supra note 4, at 64. The union and employer may, and often do, resolve
consensually all pre-election issues through a consent election agreement, subject to approval by
the Regional Director. Id.
59 Id. at 64–65 (citations omitted).
60 Id. at 67.
61 Id.
62 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
63 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006).
64 156 N.L.R.B. at 1239–40.
65 RAY ET AL., supra note 4, at 67; see also id. at 85 (“Both anecdotal evidence and
empirical studies have emphasized the importance of union contact with the bargaining unit
employees to the chances of union success in an organizing campaign.”).
66 LEWIS & KRUPMAN, supra note 52, at 162.
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3. The Representation Election
The Act does prescribe some procedural details regarding the
representation election process. Either party is entitled to have
observers present.67 The Employer may challenge a voter’s eligibility
to vote in the election, in which case the voter’s ballot is merely
separated from the others, and, if the Regional Director rules against
the challenge, it is tallied along with the others.68 Objections relating
to the conduct of the election must be filed with the Regional Director
within seven days of the election.69 Once these objections are
investigated and resolved,70 the NLRB will certify that the union is, or
is not, the collective bargaining representative of that particular unit.71
Finally, any party who disagrees with the Regional Director’s pre- or
post-election decision may request review by the Board within
fourteen days after the election results are certified.72 Such review,
however, is only allowed under a limited number of circumstances.73
The Act does not specify, on the other hand, how soon after
petitioning the election must be held. The Dunlop Commission
observed in 1994 that the “median time from petitioning for an
election to a vote has been roughly fifty days for the last two decades
(down considerably from the time taken in the 1940s and 1950s).”74
But the time lapse is even smaller today. In 2008, for instance,
elections were held in a median of thirty-eight days.75 Nevertheless,
the length of the process remained a primary complaint for labor

67 NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(a) (2011) (“Any party may be
represented by observers of its own selection.”).
68 RAY ET AL., supra note 4, at 67–68. The eligibility of a particular employee to vote may
be challenged in that he is a supervisor, his job classification falls outside the bargaining unit, or
he was previously discharged. See LEWIS & KRUPMAN, supra note 52, at 224 (discussing
reasons why a potential voter may be challenged); see also 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(a) (2010) (“Any
party and Board agents may challenge, for good cause, the eligibility of any person to
participate in the election. The ballots of such challenged persons shall be impounded.”).
69 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(a) (2010).
70 The Regional Director will order a rerun election if he or she finds that a valid objection
has been raised. RAY ET AL., supra note 4, at 68; see also GOULD, supra note 9, at 46 (“The
regional director will investigate but need not hold a hearing to determine the validity of the
objections unless a party challenging the election shows through specific evidence relating to
specific individuals material issues of fact sufficient to support a prima facie showing of
objectionable conduct.”). The original winner wins most rerun elections. LEWIS & KRUPMAN,
supra note 52, at 238.
71 Conduct Elections, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., http://www.nlrb.gov/what-wedo/conduct-elections (last visited Jan. 2, 2012).
72 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(b) (2010).
73 See 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(c) (2010), for the circumstances under which the Board will
grant review.
74 Estreicher, supra note 41, at 5 (citation omitted).
75 Id.; Greenhouse, supra note 1, at B3.
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organizations and substantially motivated the recent amendments.76
Samuel Estreicher, Professor at the New York University School of
Law,77 explained why the time lapse could be cause for concern for
the following reason: “This [time lapse] is considered problematic
because employee interest in collective representation can wane and
dissipate simply by the passage of time. The gap in time before the
election takes place also enables employers to reduce support for the
union by running anti-union campaigns . . . .”78
4. How Employers and Unions Present Their Views
Employees solicited by the union have heard only one side of the
story and, consequently, it is important that the employer also be
permitted to communicate with the proposed unit.79 “[T]he Board
itself,” observed one commentator, “has stressed that the opportunity
for both sides, both the employer as well as the union, to reach all the
employees is basic to a fair and informed election.”80 Another
commentator explained that employees should hear all the downsides
of the unionization effort—“about union dues, fees, and assessments .
. . . [about] the union’s political posture or social agenda.”81 Section
8(c) of the Act expressly protects an employer’s right to oppose
unionization in that “[t]he expressing of any views, argument, or
opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed,
graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an
unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this [Act], if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit.”82 Thus, provided an employer does not threaten or coerce its
employees or promise a benefit, it may conduct an aggressive antiunionization campaign.
Nonetheless, unions retain a significant advantage in the
presentation of their views. As one commentator noted, “a union will
be fully prepared to campaign before an election occurs, as the union
controls when a representation election will happen.”83 Professor
See infra text accompanying note 78.
Faculty Profiles: Samuel Estreicher, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW,
https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/profile.cfm?personID=19902 (last visited Jan. 2, 2012).
78 Estreicher, supra note 41, at 4–5.
79 See LEWIS & KRUPMAN, supra note 52, at 70 (“An employer is entitled to oppose
unionization, and may mount a legitimate campaign against it.”).
80 PUBLIC MEETING, supra note 44, at 11 (statement of Arnold E. Perl).
81 Id. at 55 (statement of Peter Kirsanow); see also id. at 74 (statement of Michael
Prendergast) (“[I]f [employees] don’t get those facts from the employers, they won’t get them
anywhere else.”).
82 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006).
83 PUBLIC MEETING, supra note 44, at 344 (statement of William Messenger).
76
77
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Epstein further observed that “unions are not bound by the same
restrictions that govern employer speech and thus are free to make
promises, and often make threats against recalcitrant workers that are
difficult to prove or counteract.”84 Only unions are permitted to visit
employees at their home.85 Neither the Act nor the Rules and
Regulations, moreover, limit the number of visits or the number of
union representatives in any particular visit.86 Consequently, many
employees are left with “an unrebutted story, a one-sided story, not
necessarily an accurate one.”87
II. A COLOSSAL DECLINE IN UNION MEMBERSHIP
The number of American workers in unions has declined
significantly in recent decades.88 According to a 2004 Congressional
Research Report, “[t]he number of union members peaked in 1979 at
an estimated 21.0 million.”89 As a percentage, on the other hand,
union membership peaked in the mid-1950’s at approximately 35
percent of American workers.90 In 2010, that number slipped to a
seventy-year low of 11.9 percent.91 One commentator characterized
this decline as “exceptional in comparison to other labor
movements.”92 Indeed, the decline of the American labor movement
began much earlier and has been much more severe as compared to
other western nations, “leading to substantially lower levels of
collective bargaining coverage than elsewhere.”93
What caused this colossal decline in union membership? The
change may be explained, in part, by recent large-scale layoffs—
particularly in the construction, manufacturing, education, and local
government sectors.94 One commentator offered this additional
justification: “[I]n an increasingly globalized, very fast-moving
world, unionized companies may not be able to adjust as quickly.”95
EPSTEIN, supra note 54, at 43.
See id. at 42 (“Multiple home visits are permitted to unions but not management.”).
86 See id. at 42–43 (explaining that multiple home visits are permitted and nothing limits
the number of union representatives in any visit).
87 PUBLIC MEETING, supra note 44, at 55 (statement of Peter Kirsanow).
88 MAYER, supra note 3, at 10.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 12.
91 Steven Greenhouse, Union Membership in U.S. Fell to a 70-Year Low Last Year, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/business/22union.html.
92 John Godard, The Exceptional Decline of the American Labor Movement, 63 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 82, 82 (2009).
93 Id.
94 Greenhouse, supra note 91.
95 Id. (quoting Barry T. Hirsch). A unionized workforce is more expensive for an
employer to maintain, see MAYER, supra note 3, at 6 (“[M]ost studies find that, after controlling
for individual, job, and labor market characteristics, the wages of union workers are in the range
84
85
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Moreover, “immutable economic forces,” “shifts in labor force
composition,” and the failure of unions to adjust to “economic
realities” may have caused the decline.96 Finally, because they are
protected by a host of federal laws aimed at a wide variety of
workplace conduct, employees may not feel the need for union
protection.97
Employers may also be partly responsible. “[They] have become
more sensitive to employee concerns, resulting in greater job
satisfaction among nonunion workers and reducing the demand for
unionization.”98 Many employers, moreover, have become more
“aggressive”99 and “sophisticated”100 in their resistance to
unionization.
Finally, there is the argument made by many labor organizations—
that the enormous decline can be attributed to an unfair election
process. As Richard Trumka, president of the American Federation of
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (“AFL-CIO”) stated,
“‘[o]ur current system has become a broken, bureaucratic maze that
stalls and stymies workers’ choices.’”101 Kimberly Brown, Executive
Director of American Rights at Work, expressed a similar opinion:
“When employees want to vote, they should have a fair chance to do
so. As the countless workers who have seen their hopes for a better
life deferred again and again know all too well, justice delayed is
truly justice denied.”102 Professor Epstein, however, has voiced an
alternative view: “[I]t is clear that the decline in unionization cannot
be attributed to any of the rules governing campaigns, which have
been stable in form for well over forty years.”103 In any event, by

of 10 [percent] to 30 [percent] higher than the wages of nonunion workers.”), and reduces its
rate of profit. Id. at 10.
96 See Godard, supra note 91, at 83, 100 (citations omitted) (discussing explanations for
the American labor movement’s decline).
97 See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006); Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2006); Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2006);
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006); Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e–17 (2006).
98 MAYER, supra note 3, at 17.
99 See Greenhouse, supra note 91 (quoting Mr. Hirsch as saying “companies have grown
more . . . aggressive about resisting organizing drives”).
100 See MAYER, supra note 3, at 17 (“[M]anagement may have become more sophisticated
in opposing attempts by workers to unionize.”).
101 Greenhouse, supra note 1, at B3 (quoting Mr. Trumka).
102 PUBLIC MEETING, supra note 44, at 300–01 (statement of Kimberly Freeman Brown).
103 EPSTEIN, supra note 54, at 43. Professor Epstein also argued that “any effort to attribute
the decline in the American market to distinctive factors of our own system of labor law sorely
misses the point. Larger, global trends are very much in evidence, which undercut the key union
claim that distinctive American bargaining procedures drive the current decline in union
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proposing sweeping amendments to existing election procedures in
June 2011,104 the Board revealed its own major objections to the
process.
III. THE NLRB PROPOSES FAR-REACHING AMENDMENTS TO ITS
REPRESENTATION ELECTION RULES
On June 21, 2011, the Board proposed extensive reforms to the
procedures that it employs during representation elections.105
According to the Board, “[t]he proposed amendments [were] designed
to fix flaws in the Board’s current procedures that buil[t] in
unnecessary delays, allow[ed] wasteful litigation, and fail[ed] to take
advantage of modern communication technologies.”106 Anne Marie
Lofaso, Professor of Law at West Virginia University,107 praised the
proposals in that, “while modest, [they would] go a long way toward
fixing the well-known problems associated with the current election
rules.”108 Below is a brief synopsis of the proposed amendments.
A. Substance of the New Amendments and What the NLRB Hopes to
Accomplish
First, and perhaps most significantly, the proposals would
streamline election procedures.109 Under the current rules, parties may
seek Board review of pre-election rulings “even though such requests
are rarely filed, even more rarely granted, and almost never result in a
stay of the election.”110 As a result, most union elections are held
several weeks after the filing of an election petition.111 The revised

membership.” Id. at 13. See id. at 10–20, for a more detailed analysis of the union membership
decline.
104 See Representation—Case Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,812 (June 22, 2011) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 101, 102, and 103) [hereinafter Proposed Amendments].
105 Proposed Amendments to NLRB Election Rules and Regulations Fact Sheet, NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/print/525 (last visited Mar. 3, 2012)
[hereinafter Fact Sheet]. These proposals took up thirty-six pages in the Federal Register. See
Proposed Amendments, supra note 104.
106 Fact Sheet, supra note 105; see also Greenhouse, supra note 1, at B3 (explaining that
the Board seeks with these amendments to “tighten the [election] process by ensuring the
employers, employees and unions receive needed information sooner and by delaying litigation
over many voter-eligibility issues until after [the election]”).
107 Anne
Marie Lofaso, WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW,
http://law.wvu.edu/faculty/full_time_faculty/anne_m_lofaso (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
108 PUBLIC MEETING, supra note 44, at 36 (statement of Anne Marie Lofaso).
109 Fact Sheet, supra note 105.
110 Id.
111 Id. (“Elections routinely are delayed 25-30 days . . . .”); Estreicher, supra note 41, at 5
(observing that, in 2008, elections were held in a median of 28 days after the union filed an
election petition).
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rules, by eliminating pre-election requests for review, aim to
eliminate this “unnecessary” delay.112 The Board did not expressly
dictate a timeline for the conduct of an election. But Member Hayes
indicated in his dissent that the expedited process would result in
elections taking place between ten and twenty-one days after the
filing of a petition.113
The proposals second seek to facilitate compliance assistance.
Current election procedures mandate that both a copy of the election
petition and notice of any pre-election hearing be served upon each
party.114 Under the revised procedures, these documents would be
accompanied by a description of NLRB representation election
procedures and a Statement of Position Form.115 This requirement is
intended to help parties understand the process and identify the issues
they may want to raise at the pre-election hearing.116
Third, the proposals would make Board pre- and post-election
hearing dates “explicit and uniform.”117 These dates are currently
unpredictable and vary by region.118 Absent special circumstances,
the proposed amendments would have pre-election hearings begin
seven days after a hearing notice is served on the parties.119 Postelection hearings, moreover, would begin fourteen days after the
ballots are tallied.120
Fourth, the proposals seek to ensure that pre-election hearings are
limited to resolving genuine disputes.121 There are presently no
mechanisms in place to narrow the issues addressed during preelection hearings.122 Although section 11217 of the Casehandling
Manual provides that “[p]rior to the presentation of evidence or
witnesses, parties to the hearing should succinctly state on the record
their positions as to the issues to be heard,” such practice is voluntary
and, consequently, is not uniformly followed.123 The proposed rules
112 Fact

Sheet, supra note 105.
Proposed Amendments, supra note 104, at 36,831.
114 NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.63(a) (2011).
115 Proposed Amendments, supra note 104, at 36,838 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. §
102.63(a)(1)). The Board identified the purpose of a Statement of Position form as follows:
“[The] form would solicit the parties’ position on the Board’s jurisdiction to process the
petition; the appropriateness of the petitioned-for unit; any proposed exclusions from the
petitioned-for unit; the existence of any bar to the election; the type, dates, times, and location of
the election; and any other issues that a party intends to raise at hearing.” Id. at 36,821.
116 Fact Sheet, supra note 105.
117 Proposed Amendments, supra note 104, at 36,821.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 36,838 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. § 102.63(a)(1)).
120 Id. at 36,844 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(b)).
121 Id. at 36,822.
122 Fact Sheet, supra note 105.
123 Proposed Amendments, supra note 104, at 36,814.
113 See
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would require parties to state their positions on all issues to be
litigated no later than the start of the hearing and before any evidence
is presented.124 A hearing officer would determine whether a genuine
issue exists, as opposed to the Regional Director, who would have
discretion regarding the presentation of witnesses or introduction of
relevant evidence.125 Finally, parties would lose their ability to later
litigate any issues other than the ones raised in a Statement of
Position or in response thereto.126
Fifth, the proposals intend to reduce unnecessary litigation.127
Under current practices, pre-election hearings are often devoted to
voter-eligibility issues that “may not affect the outcome of the
election and thus ultimately may not need to be resolved.”128 Under
the proposed amendments, however, those eligibility issues involving
less than 20 percent of the bargaining unit would be deferred until
after the election.129 The Board justified this proposal in that:
[D]eferring both the litigation and resolution of eligibility and
inclusion questions affecting no more than 20 percent of
eligible voters represents a reasonable balance of the public’s
and parties’ interest in prompt resolution of questions
concerning representation and employees’ interest in
knowing precisely who will be in the unit should they choose
to be represented.130
Sixth, the proposals would consolidate requests for review of all
Regional Director’s decisions.131 Under current election rules, parties
124 See id. at 36,841 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. § 102.66(a)(1) (“[A]fter the employer
completes its Statement of Position and prior to the introduction of further evidence, the
petitioner shall respond to each issue raised in the Statement. The hearing officer shall not
receive evidence relevant to any issue concerning which parties have not taken adverse positions
. . . .”); Fact Sheet, supra note 105 (“The parties would be required to state their positions no
later than the start of the hearing . . . .”).
125 Proposed Amendments, supra note 104, at 36,841 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. §
102.66(a)) (“Any party shall have the right to appear at any hearing . . . and the hearing officer
shall have power to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses and to introduce into the record
documentary and other evidence relevant to any genuine dispute as to a material fact.”).
126 The proposed rules provide for two exceptions to this general mandate. Parties are not
precluded from contesting or presenting evidence related to the Board’s statutory jurisdiction to
process the election petition. Id. at 36,841 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. § 102.66(c)). Nor are
they precluded from later litigating voter-eligibility issues. Id.
127 Fact Sheet, supra note 105.
128 Id.
129 See Proposed Amendments, supra note 104, at 36,841 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. §
102.66(d)) (“If at any time during the [pre-election] hearing, the hearing officer determines that
the only issues remaining in dispute concern the eligibility or inclusion of individuals who
would constitute less than 20 percent of the unit if they were found to be eligible to vote, the
hearing officer shall close the hearing.”).
130 Id. at 36,824.
131 Id. at 36,817.
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must request Board review of pre-election rulings before the election
and, if they fail to do so, they then waive that right.132 The revised
rules would allow parties to seek review of those and post-election
rulings—which have always been addressed separately—through a
“single, post-election request.”133 Special permission to appeal to the
Board will be granted only in those “extraordinary circumstances
where it appears that the issue will otherwise evade review.”134 These
revisions would, moreover, make Board review of both pre- and postelection decisions discretionary—leaving final decisions about many
disputed issues to the Regional Director.135
Lastly, the proposals are intended to facilitate communication
between the union and employees in the proposed unit. The Board
contends that “employers are, with increasing frequency, using e-mail
to communicate with employees about the vote.”136 Accordingly, the
revised election procedures would require the employer provide the
union not only a final list of employee names and addresses, as is
currently mandated, but also the personal telephone numbers and email addresses of those employees, if available.137
B. A Controversial Announcement: Reactions to the New Amendments
Rulemaking may very well be the superior law-making
mechanism, as described in Part I. This section, however, argues that
the Board’s use of the formal rulemaking process in this instance fails
because it did not permit ample reflection and the amendments
themselves provide insufficient time for employers to communicate
their views on unionization, require the disclosure of personal
employee information, and unfairly benefit unions.
The public outcry that followed the June 22 publication of the
proposed amendments, however, raised serious questions as to the
Board’s reasoning and decision-making process.138 The proposed
132 See NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(f) (2011) (“Failure to request
review shall preclude such parties from relitigating [sic] . . . any issue which was, or could have
been, raised [at the hearing].”).
133 Fact Sheet, supra note 105; see also Proposed Amendments, supra note 104, at 36,
842–45 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.67 and 102.69) (eliminating parties’ right to file preelection request for review of Regional Director decision).
134 Proposed Amendments, supra note 104, at 36,840 (to be codified as 29 § C.F.R.
102.65(c)).
135 See id. at 36,837, 36,844–45 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.62(b) and 102.69(d))
(setting forth the process under which a party may request Board review of a Regional Director
ruling).
136 Id. at 36,820.
137 Id. at 36,838 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. § 102.62(d)).
138 This is in sharp contrast to the careful and prolonged consideration given to collective
bargaining units in healthcare facilities. See supra text accompanying note 33.
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amendments were quickly dubbed by opponents as the “quickie,”
“ambush,”139 and “microwave election”140 rule. In a memorandum to
House Republicans, moreover, House Majority Leader Eric Cantor
included the proposal in a list of the ten most harmful regulations
proposed by the Obama administration.141 Other commentators
accused the Board of acting pursuant to a politically motivated
agenda. Phil Kerpen, author of Democracy Denied, commented that
“what the NLRB is doing is not the action of one rogue agency or a
few envelope-pushing employees so much as it is a deliberate strategy
to use the federal government’s regulatory powers to achieve what
Obama and his political supporters want without having to bother
with going to Congress first.”142 In all, the Board received more than
65,000 public comments relating to the proposals.143
The Board invited comments on its proposed amendments through
a contentious public hearing held on July 18 and 19.144 More than
sixty speakers from the business, labor, academic, and advocacy
communities participated in the hearing.145 Overall, the proposals
“[were] backed by labor but heavily criticized by business groups.”146
Employer representatives found no justification for changing current
election procedure. Maurice Baskin, speaking on behalf of the
139 AGC Urges NLRB to Withdraw “Quickie Election” Rule, AGC OF AMERICA (Aug. 23,
2011),
http://news.agc.org/2011/08/23/agc-urges-nlrb-to-withdraw-%E2%80%9Cquickieelection%E2%80%9D-rule/.
140 John Hayward, NLRB Backs Off On Microwave Union Elections, HUMAN EVENTS
(Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=47843.
141 Kevin Bogardus, House Republicans Paint Target on NLRB’s Proposed Union Election
Rules, THE HILL (Sept. 5, 2011), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/179509-house-goppaints-target-on-proposed-union-election-rules.
142 Peter Roff, Out of Control NLRB Strikes Again, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Nov.
29, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter-roff/2011/11/29/out-of-control-nlrbstrikes-again; see also Peck, supra note 39, at 259 (arguing that, although the Board must
inevitably make some politically-inspired policy-making decisions, such decisions “should be
kept at the minimum necessary for effective discharge of the Board’s functions”); Carl
Horowitz, House Overrides NLRB’s Ambush-Election, Micro-Union Positions, NATIONAL
LEGAL AND POLICY CENTER (Dec. 8, 2011), http://nlpc.org/stories/2011/12/08/house-overridesnlrbs-ambush-election-micro-union-positions (“Unable to get Congress to enact his labor
initiatives, [President Obama] has made appointments to the NLRB and the Labor Department
who are committed to producing the equivalent of such legislative outcomes as much as
possible.”).
143 NLRB Issues Final Rule on Union Elections; Business Groups Respond With Lawsuit,
THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC. (Dec. 23, 2011), http://www.bna.com/nlrb-issuesfinal-n12884906645/. The AFL-CIO alone submitted more than 21,000 comments in support of
the proposed amendments. Bogardus, supra note 141.
144 See PUBLIC MEETING, supra note 44 for a full transcript of the proceeding.
145 Details Released on July 18-19 Open Meeting About Proposed Election Rule
Amendments,
NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
BOARD
(July
8,
2011),
https://www.nlrb.gov/news/details-released-july-18-19-open-meeting-about-proposed-electionrule-amendments.
146 Bogardus, supra note 141.
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Associated Builders and Contractors Inc., questioned whether the
Board had been given “a full appreciation of the sense of outrage in
the business community.”147 He also commented that, “in the midst of
this terrible economy, the NLRB [should not be] proposing new and
burdensome regulations that appear to have no purpose other than to
promote union organizing.”148 The following sections discuss the
most prominent objections.
1. Inadequate Thought and Consideration
As a threshold issue, many employer representatives criticized the
Board for its failure to proceed with the caution mandated by formal
rulemaking. Representing the Society for Human Resource
Management, Roger King commented that “[there is] simply not a
record for the proposed rules,” and asked the Board to “reconsider the
speed with which [it is] proceeding and give much more thought and
consideration to what [it is] doing.”149 Another speaker, noting that
the rules would impact approximately one hundred million
employees, suggested that the Board “take a little bit more than two
days to hear what everybody has to say face-to-face.”150
Others questioned the authority of a two-person majority to issue
such comprehensive amendments. Mr. Baskin explained to the Board
that “[there is] outrage over the haste with which you are moving
ahead with these sweeping and radical proposals, . . . particularly
without a full board of confirmed members.”151 Other speakers
offered that “it is untimely for a Board majority, which will soon be
composed of only two members, one whom sits by recess
appointment, to propose and consider any rule, especially such a farreaching rule that substantially and fundamentally changes the
provisions of the Act.”152
It should be noted that two Board members alone lack legal
authority to issue new regulations and rulings.153 Recall that the recess
147 PUBLIC

MEETING, supra note 44, at 271 (statement of Maurice Baskin).

148 Id.
149 Id.

at 236, 240 (statement of Roger King).
at 88 (statement of Oliver Bell).
151 Id. at 271 (statement of Maurice Baskin).
152 Id. at 286 (statement of Harold Weinrich). Member Hayes would later articulate this
same position: “[I]t would ‘contravene long-standing’ board rules for a two-person majority to
adopt such a sweeping decision.” Steven Greenhouse, Republican Might Quit Labor Board,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2011, at B1. Existing procedures could not, in his opinion, “simply be cast
aside in pursuit of a singular policy agenda without doing irreparable harm to the board’s
legitimacy.” Id.
153 See New Process Steel v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2645 (2010) (“If Congress wishes to
allow the Board to decide cases with only two members, it can easily do so. But until it does,
Congress’ decision to require that the Board’s full power be delegated to no fewer than three
150 Id.
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appointment of Member Becker was set to expire in January 2012.
Thus, the Democratic majority was motivated to act expeditiously, as
least in part, out of concern that it would soon lose its authority to
vote on the proposed amendments.154 The hastiness with which these
amendments were issued does little to engender confidence in Board
rules.
2. Unreasonable Time Frame
Employer representatives also criticized the shortening of the preelection time period in that it would provide insufficient time for
employers to communicate with employees regarding the pros and
cons of unionization.155 This argument was first articulated by
Member Hayes in his dissent: “[T]he majority has announced its
intent to provide a more expeditious preelection [sic] process and a
more limited postelection [sic] process that tilts heavily against
employers’ rights to engage in legitimate free speech.”156 One speaker
similarly contended that, “[u]nless an employer has an adequate
opportunity to fully utilize its free speech rights between the time a
petition is filed and an election is held, employees’ rights are
destroyed, and the employer’s free speech rights become
meaningless.”157 Another, detailing the right employees have to
receive information opposing unionization, noted that “[t]here is an
inseparable bond between a fair election and the right to be
informed.”158 As for employers, on the other hand, the revised rules

members, and to provide for a Board quorum of three, must be given practical effect rather than
swept aside in the face of admittedly difficult circumstances.”).
154 See Greenhouse, supra note 152, at B1 (”With Senate Republicans vowing to block any
replacement nominees, the board will have only two of the five members it is supposed to have
— not enough to issue any decisions or rules.”).
155 Chairman Pearce contended, however, that the revisions would affect only 10 percent of
elections: “The vast majority of NLRB-supervised elections, about 90 percent, are held by
agreement of the parties . . . in an average of 38 days from the filing of a petition.” Tim
Devaney, GOP seeks to head off NLRB rules, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2011, at A10. “[T]he
amendments would apply to the minority of elections which are held up by needless litigation
and disputes which need to be resolved prior to an election . . . . In these contested elections,
employees have to wait an average of 101 days to cast a ballot.” Id.
156 Proposed Amendments, supra note 104, at 36,833. Hayes further cautioned that the
shorter election process will “stifle full debate on matters that demand it, in furtherance of a
belief that employers should have little or no involvement in the resolution of questions
concerning representation.” Id. at 36,829.
157 PUBLIC MEETING, supra note 44, at 285 (statement of Harold Weinrich).
158 Id. at 392 (statement of Jay Krupin); see also GOULD, supra note 9, at 47 (“It is hoped
that the choice [of whether or not to unionize] will be an informed one.”). The Supreme Court
has held that employees have an implicit right to receive information opposing unionization.
Chamber v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2414 (2008) (concluding that Section 157 of the Act,
which references the right of employees to refuse to join unions, “implies an underlying right to
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“unduly and severely cut into the time that [they] have to
communicate with employees during an election campaign, when
their right to do that is at its greatest and most important.”159
Some speakers argued, moreover, that a shortened election process
would harm many small employers. As Tom Coleman, speaking for
the Printing Industries of America, indicated, “[t]hey don’t have
access to good sound advice and counsel as how to live within the
rules, and they don’t have the opportunity to get guidance on how
they can communicate with their employees.”160 Robert Garbini,
President of the National Ready Mix Concrete Association, further
explained that, where legal counsel specializing in union campaigns is
not readily accessible, the truncated time frame will “lead to a greater
number of pre- and post-election complaints and possibly unfair labor
practices due to objectionable actions on part of the employers who
are unfamiliar with the intricate and confusing laws and rules
governing union elections.”161
Union representatives countered that an expedited election process
would reduce the opportunity for employers to game the system and
use procedural delay to intimidate employees. One speaker argued
that “management is not concerned about workers’ rights, but,
[instead], they’re more concerned with keeping 100 percent control of
their business to do whatever they want whenever they want at all
cost.”162 In response to these accusations, Stephen Jones, Director of
Human Resources for Chandler Concrete Company, suggested that
the Board punish those particular employers with increased sanctions.
“Deal with the bad apples,” he argued, “[d]on’t replace or go in and
replant the orchard.”163
The shortened election process will surely hinder employers in
their ability to communicate their views about unionization and,
consequently, deprive employees of their right to make an informed
decision. Allowing unions an unfair advantage in the representation

receive information opposing unionization”).
159 PUBLIC MEETING, supra note 44, at 422 (statement of David Kadela). “Why the need to
rush?” asks Wyoming Senator Mike Enzi, ranking Republican on the Senate Health, Education,
Labor and Pensions Committee. “If employees want to unionize they should be allowed to do
so, but to ram elections through before important questions are asked or answered does a
disservice to everyone involved.” Sam Hananel, Rules Would Speed Up Union Elections, ABC
NEWS (June 21, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=13896394#.TwZUMtRbe8A.
160 PUBLIC MEETING, supra note 44, at 307–08 (statement of Francis T. “Tom” Coleman).
161 Id. at 160 (statement of Robert Garbini).
162 Id. at 337–38 (statement of Lexer Quamie); see also id. at 38 (statement of Anne Marie
Lofaso) (“The amendments eliminate unnecessary bureaucratic delay, thereby diminishing
opportunities for unscrupulous parties to take advantage of systemic delay.”).
163 Id. at 316–17 (statement of Stephen Jones).
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election process could undermine election results and, as a result, the
legitimacy of the union itself.
3. Invasion of Privacy
Employer representatives also objected to the expanded Excelsior
list requirements, namely the disclosure of personal telephone
numbers and e-mail addresses, in that they contemplate a serious
invasion of personal privacy. William Messenger, speaking for the
National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, predicted that
“[most employees] would likely be appalled to learn that a
government agency is contemplating handing out their personal
information to a third-party special interest group without their
consent, or even potentially over their objection.”164 He went on to
suggest that “employees’ personal privacy outweighs any kind of
attempt to balance the electoral campaign between unions and
employers.”165 Another speaker criticized the proposed requirement in
that it “go[es] far beyond disclosing one’s home address where [the
employee] can simply shut the door, go back to dinner, and be done
with it.”166 Instead, forcing the employee to delete hundreds of text
messages and e-mails will disrupt the workplace and intrude on his
right to privacy.167 Mr. Baskin offered, moreover, that the two-day
period for producing Excelsior material is impossible, particularly
with respect to laid off employees whose information may not be
readily available to the employer.168
Employees have a legitimate right to privacy. The union’s interest
in contacting the bargaining unit does not overshadow that right. At
the very least, employees should have a choice as to whether or not to
provide their personal contact information and expose themselves to
potential harassment.
4. The Creation of an Unequal Playing Field
Lastly, many comments touched on whether the proposed
revisions would allow unions an unfair advantage in that they have
unlimited time prior to the election petition to communicate their
views, whereas employers would only have the brief time between
receiving notice of the petition and the election itself. Peter Kirsanow,
counsel for the National Association of Manufacturers, observed that:
164 Id.

at 344 (statement of William Messenger).
at 349.
166 Id. at 108 (statement of Ron Holland).
167 Id. at 108–09.
168 Id. at 274 (statement of Maurice Baskin).
165 Id.
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It takes many, if not most, employers, even the larger ones,
up to two weeks to figure out what it is that they even want to
say about the particular issue, and thereafter, they’ll have
three to four [] weeks to communicate that message to
employees, in contrast to the [thirty] to [forty] weeks the
union may have already used to communicate its message.169
As one speaker theorized, “[i]f unions were required to notify the
employer at the outset of their campaign, that would be one thing, but
often the first the employer . . . learn[s] of the campaign is upon
receipt of the petition.”170 Employers are already disadvantaged in
their ability to conduct anti-union campaigns and, under the proposed
amendments, would be disadvantaged even further. Representation
elections facilitate the employee’s choice as to whether or not to
unionize. Employees will find little protection, however, in a flawed
election process.
C. A Congressional Blockade
The contentious debate exhibited during the public hearing quickly
reached the halls of Congress. House Republicans rallied behind
legislation intended to block the proposed union election rules.171
Representative John Kline, chairman of the House Education and the
Workforce Committee, was particularly vigilant in the battle against
Big Labor.172 He proposed a bill that would pre-empt any attempt at
an expedited election by requiring at least fourteen days before a preelection hearing could be held, allowing employers time to find legal
counsel, and a minimum of thirty-five days before balloting.173 His
bill would also bar unions from requiring employers to provide
employee telephone numbers and e-mail addresses.174
The House Education and the Workforce Committee voted in
November to approve the bill.175 It passed in the House by a 235–188
vote.176 According to numerous commentators, however, the bill is
not likely to fair well in the Democratic-controlled Senate.177
169 Id.

at 54–55 (statement of Peter Kirsanow).
at 42 (statement of Eric Schweitzer).
171 Bogardus, supra note 141.
172 Kevin Diaz, Rep. Kline Opens New Front on Labor Fight, STAR TRIBUNE, Oct. 6, 2011,
at 4A (“[Kline has] thrust himself into a growing GOP battle with organized labor.”).
173 The Workforce Democracy and Fairness Act, H.R. 3094, 112th Cong. §§ 2(2)(A) and
2(2)(C)(ii) (2011).
174 See id. at § 2(2)(D) (allowing the employee to choose his preferred mode of
communication).
175 Greenhouse, supra note 152, at B1.
176 157 CONG. REC. H7985–7986 (Nov. 30, 2011).
177 See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Republican Might Quit Labor Board, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
170 Id.
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D. Member Hayes Threatens to Resign
On November 18, 2011, the Board announced that it would hold a
public session later that month to vote on the proposed union election
rules. In response, Member Hayes threatened not to attend the
session, which would deprive the Board of the quorum needed to vote
on the rules.178 Hayes alleged that Members Pearce and Becker had
been less than candid regarding the final revisions they planned to
make and had not adequately shared with him the public comments
they received.179 Peter Schaumber, former Board chairman, supported
this choice: “[Hayes] can’t be forced under these circumstances to
participate in a judicial charade.”180
But this public threat was not universally commended. Chairman
Pearce criticized Hayes for making “false or misleading allegations”
and publicizing an internal matter.181 Representative George Miller,
senior Democrat of the House Education and the Workforce
Committee, also denounced the decision in that “[Hayes] voluntarily
chose not to participate in the shaping of the rules and the
deliberations, and now he’s complaining about it.”182
Hayes kept observers guessing as to whether he would attend the
session.183 He ultimately decided, however, to participate in the vote.
“It is not my nature to be obstructionist,” he explained.184 “I believe
resignation would cause the very same harm and collateral damage to
the reputation of this agency.”185
E. An Imperfect Resolution: The Final Amendments
The Board, in an attempted compromise, ultimately voted to adopt
a watered-down version of the proposed amendments.186 The 2–1 vote
was as expected: Members Pearce and Becker supporting the proposal

22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/23/business/brian-e-hayes-threatens-to-quit-laborboard.html?pagewanted=all (“[A]pproval by the Democratic-controlled Senate is doubtful.”);
Devaney, supra note 155, at A10 (“[T]he bill] could end up being benched by the Senate.”).
178 Greenhouse, supra note 152, at B1; see also supra note 153 and accompanying text
(explaining that no fewer than three Board members may issue new regulations).
179 Greenhouse, supra note 152, at B1.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Tim Mak, NLRB approves union election rule, POLITICO.COM (Nov. 30, 2011),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1111/69459.html.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. (“Because of [its] impending deadline, the NLRB, ahead of [the November 30] vote,
stripped its proposed rule on union elections of the more controversial aspects that had
previously been proposed.”).
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and Member Hayes voting no.187 In a press release that same day,
Representative Kline made his continued opposition to the
amendments clear: “Ignoring the will of Congress and objections
raised by countless organizations representing workers and
employers, the NLRB has chosen to deliver a final ambush election
rule to its Big Labor allies.”188 The six amendments formally adopted
by the Board provide as follows:
1. Hearing officers at pre-election hearings are given the
authority to limit the proceeding to issues relevant to whether
an election is appropriate.189
2. Post-hearing briefs may be filed “only upon special
permission of the hearing officer,” when the case presents
issues that would benefit from such briefing.190 The hearing
officer is given further discretion over the subjects to be
addressed and the time for filing.191
3. Appeals concerning both pre- and post-election issues are
consolidated into a “single post-election procedure” and, thus,
“avoid[] altogether appeals of issues that become moot as a
result of the election.”192
4. The recommendation that the Regional Director should
delay the scheduling of elections at least twenty-five days to
permit time for a pre-election appeal is discontinued.193
Section 101.21 currently reads as follows: “[U]nless a waiver
is filed, the Director will normally not schedule an election
187 Id. The final amendments were published in the Federal Register on December 22,
2011. See Final Amendments, supra note 49. They will take effect on April 30, 2012. Id.
188 Press
Release,
John
Kline
(Dec.
21,
2011),
http://edworkforce.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=273371; see also
Melanie Trottman, Board Scales Back Union-Vote Plan, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2011, at A8
(reporting that the scaled-back version “did little to quell concerns among employers who have
opposed the measure since it was unveiled in June”).
189 Final Amendments, supra note 49, at 80,185 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. § 102.66(a))
(“Any party shall have the right to appear at any hearing . . . , to call, examine, and crossexamine witnesses, and to introduce into the record documentary and other evidence so long as
such examination, cross-examination, and other evidence supports its contentions and is relevant
to the existence of a question of representation or a bar to an election.”).
190 Id. at 80,185 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. § 102.66(d)); Explanation of Resolution,
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/print/3093 (last visited Mar. 3,
2011).
191 Final Amendments, supra note 49, at 80,185 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. § 102.66(d)).
192 Explanation of resolution, supra note 190; see also Final Amendments, supra note 49,
at 80,185–88 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.67 and 102.69 (eliminating parties’ right to file
pre-election request for review of Regional Director decision).
193 Final Amendments, supra note 49, at 80,181 (“Remove and reserve subpart C,
consisting of §§ 101.17 through 101.21.”).

4/12/2012 10:34:36 AM

614

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:2

until a date between the 25th and 30th day after the date of
the decision, to permit the Board to rule on any request for
review which may be filed.”194
5. The circumstances under which a request for special
permission to appeal to the Board will be granted are made
explicit.195 In particular, “[t]he Board will not grant a request
for special permission to appeal except in extraordinary
circumstances where it appears that the issue will otherwise
evade review.”196
6. The appeal procedure is simplified in that Board review of
any appeals relating to the election process is discretionary.197
Some proposals, however, are noticeably absent from the final
amendments. Employers need not provide employee telephone
numbers and e-mail addresses.198 Those provisions requiring the preelection hearing be set for seven days after service of the hearing
notice and a Statement of Position form be filed at the start of the
hearing have also been removed. But the limited nature of the
resolution does not mean that these proposals have been rejected.
They will instead remain under continued consideration by the
Board.199
The United States Chamber of Commerce filed the first federal
lawsuit to block the amendments from taking effect. The lawsuit
alleged that the revisions violate Board procedures and impermissibly
restrict the free speech rights of employers to make the case against
unions.200 “It is tragic that the Board would expend its resources in
this manner,” opined Randy Johnson, the Chamber’s senior vice
president for Labor, Immigration, and Employee Benefits, “creating
more confusion and uncertainty under our nation’s labor laws, aiding
only unions and perhaps lawyers, rather than focusing on some type
of initiative that would encourage job growth.”201 It is unlikely, given

194 NLRB
195 Final

Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 101.21 (2011).
Amendments, supra note 49, at 80,184 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. § 102.65).

196 Id.
197 Id. at 80,183, 80,187 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.62(b) and 102.69(d))
(providing for discretionary Board review).
198 Explanation of resolution, supra note 190.
199 Id.
200 Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Adopts Rules to Speed Unionization Votes, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2011, at B5.
201 Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Blasts NLRB For ‘Gift to
Organized Labor’ and Files Lawsuit to Challenge the Rule, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
(Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2011/december/us-chamber-blastsnlrb-%E2%80%98gift-organized-labor%E2%80%99-and-files-lawsuit-challen.
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the immense criticism the Board has received thus far, that this
lawsuit will be the last.
CONCLUSION
The NLRB could have chosen, consistent with its 75-year history,
to amend its representation election procedures through case-by-case
adjudication. Instead, the Board chose to issue substantive rules.
Rulemaking is an onerous process—it requires preliminary
publication in the Federal Register, careful consideration of countless
public comments, and a well-reasoned justification for the new
rule.202 But these procedural safeguards have the potential to garner
stability and confidence in Board rules, ensure political
accountability, and enhance policy making.203 Unfortunately, the
Board has achieved none of these goals here. Even the watered-down
version of these amendments are unprecedented, sweeping, and
unfair. They put employers at an extreme disadvantage in their ability
to express their views about unionization and, as a result, deprive
employees of their right to make an informed decision.204 To retain
any shroud of legitimacy with the American people, the Board,
particularly in light of its current composition,205 must show more
restraint and bipartisan diplomacy in the upcoming year.
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